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Abstract
The article seeks to ll the gap between tacit and explicit collusion in a
setting where rms observe only their own output levels and a common price,
which includes a stochastic component. Without communication, rms fail to
discriminate between random shocks and marginal deviations, which constrains
the scope for collusion. By eliminating uncertainty about what has happened,
communication facilitates detection of deviations but reduces collusive prots due
to the risk of exposure to legal sanctions. With the optimal collusive strategy,
rms communicate only if the market price falls somewhat below the trigger price.
Moreover, they tend to communicate more often as they become less patient, a
cartel grows in size, or demand uncertainty rises.
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1 Introduction
The conventional economic theory posits that collusion can be supported by a Nash
equilibrium in a game of repeated interaction, provided that each rm correctly antic-
ipates the strategic response of its rivals. A distinct feature of the economic approach
is that it rules out the need for any explicit agreement and instead emphasizes the
importance of implicit understanding among rms to coordinate their behavior so as
to achieve prots above competitive levels. By contrast, the law distinguishes collusive
behavior only if it is supported by the evidence demonstrating that rms have con-
cluded an agreement which ha[s] as [its] object or e¤ect the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition ...1 Not surprisingly, in almost all cartel cases brought
forward by the European Commission it has been found that rms systematically en-
gaged in express communication, as evidenced by the revealed notes of cartel meetings
made by the representatives of these rms.
In attempting to reduce the tension between legal and economic concepts of col-
lusion, the extant literature has primarily focused on the question of why collusive
rms communicate. By contrast, the objective of this paper is to study the question
of when they will choose to do so. One reason for raising this issue is that sharing of
commercially sensitive information (e.g., customer lists, actual prices, realized sales)
commonly requires cartels to develop the means to monitor and verify the reports of
their members. For example, the pre-insulated pipe cartel often turned to independent
auditors to certify the accuracy of the data being exchanged.2 In much the same vein,
the organic peroxides cartel used the service of AC Treuhand who acted indepen-
dently from the cartel members by undertaking and approving the auditing, which
was an essential feature of the agreement.3 Apart from this, cartel meetings often
leave traces of evidence of concerted e¤orts to restrict competition and, in such a way,
they expose conspirators to the risk of legal prosecution. For these reasons, express
communication is not only benecial: it also makes collusion less protable due to
the costs associated with either antitrust enforcement or setting up and maintaining
a monitoring scheme.
On the other hand, rms can always avoid paying these costs by colluding tacitly.
For instance, many antitrust o¢ cials share the view that if they could achieve a col-
lusive outcome without express communication, then it is unlikely that they would
1The quotation is part of Article 81 of the Treaty of Rome.
2Following the audit (carried out by Swiss accountants), which ascertained the gures for each
producers 1992 revenue (...), the producers met in Zurich on 18 or 19 August 1993 [...] (Case No
IV/35.691/E-4 - Pre-Insulated Pipe Cartel, §50)
3Case COMP/E-2/37.857 - Organic Peroxides, §333.
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ever be accused of wrongdoing because of the lack of incriminating evidence.4 This
however raises the questions of whether collusive rms should ever use communication
and, if they should, how they could minimize the costs associated with doing so.
To address these issues, the paper considers a setting similar to Green and Porter
(1984), but modies it by giving rms the opportunity to communicate. Specically, in
each period rms can meet and exchange reliable information about their past output
levels before they engage in product market competition. To capture the stylized
evidence, the model further assumes that cartel meetings can be uncovered by the
competition authority, in which case rms face nes and damages claims. As in Green
and Porter, the inability of rms to perfectly detect deviations from the collusive
output constraints the scope for collusion. The key di¤erence lies in the fact that
they can now deter deviations not only by reverting to a temporary price war but
also by verifying the exact amount of goods supplied to the market. Since both ways
are expensive, rms face a nontrivial dilemma in choosing the one which maximizes
expected prots.
The main result of the paper is that, with the uniform distribution of the demand
shocks used here, the optimal collusive strategy has the following form: rms meet
whenever the market price falls somewhat below a trigger price, and inict maximal
punishment as soon as they detect that some rm has either deviated from the collusive
output or waived the meeting when it should be held. In contrast to Green and Porter,
the strategy induces the pattern of collusive behavior in which rms never revert to a
temporary punishment phase. Put it di¤erently, they hold meetings, but the meetings
just conrm the compliance with the collusive agreement. Intuitively, communication,
in this setting, has an important deterrence e¤ect: by increasing the likelihood of
detection of deviations, it relaxes incentives to deviate.5 More precisely, given that
any detected deviation is sanctioned by a price war, it allows rms to deter all potential
deviations without involving any cost associated with the punishment phase.
Another distinct feature of the strategy obtained is that, whenever the market
experiences a price decrease, rms convene to discuss what happens. This result is
due to the uniform distribution of the demand shocks which, in particular, implies
that the probability for the market price to fall within some range is invariant with
respect to marginal changes in total output. In turn, given that the best deviation
4The common presumption is that the law must not prohibit a rational calculation by each seller
of what the consequences of his price decision would be, taking into account the probable or virtually
certain reactions of his competitors. (Turner, 1962)
5To be more precise, given that the distribution of the demand shocks has a bounded support,
some deviations can also be revealed by certain price realizations. This feature, however, does not
diminish the value of communication and disappears when the variance of the demand shocks becomes
su¢ ciently large.
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by a rm consists in increasing its output, this property implies that, by moving the
range of prices triggering communication toward the lower end of the price spectrum,
rms increase the probability of detection of deviations without changing the costs of
communication. Consequently, if they ever contemplate communicating, then doing
so is most optimal when the price falls somewhat below the trigger price.
There is also some evidence from antitrust practice supporting the predictions of the
model. In the Sorbates Case, for example, the Decision of the European Commission
states:
Hoechst and the Japanese producers monitored target price adher-
ence through the data regarding competitor pricing which they used to
receive through their dealers. When prices fell below the target prices for
key customers, the Japanese companies (mainly Daicel) and Hoechst did
on occasions telephone each other to try to ensure that such prices were
brought closer into line with the targets in the next large contract with the
same customer.6
The paper also sheds light on the determinants of the frequency of cartel meetings.
Overall, the results suggest that conspirators are likely to meet more often as they
become less patient, a cartel grows in size, or demand volatility rises. Intuitively,
in all these environments they are more tempted to deviate from a cartel agreement,
both because they may gain more from increasing their outputs and because they have
less to fear that such deviations will be detected. As a result, in order to curb the
temptation to deviate, cartels increase the intensity of monitoring.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief review
of the relevant economic literature. Section 3 outlines the framework for the analysis.
Section 4 derives the most protable collusive strategy and characterizes the impact
of communication on collusion. Section 5 studies the frequency of cartel meetings as
a function of various factors that a¤ect the sustainability of collusion. Concluding
remarks are given in Section 6.
2 Literature Review
Since the time when the traditional structure-conduct-performance paradigm gained
widespread acceptance, it has been recognized that rms communicate because they
need to reach an agreement and coordinate on a collusive outcome. In their study of
the Sugar Institute Case, Genesove and Mullin (2001) bring new insights to the role
6Case COMP/E-1/37.370 - Sorbates, §113.
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of communication in collusion.7 In particular, they argue that communication can
also enhance the e¢ ciency and the sustainability of collusion. The recent theoretical
contributions demonstrate how it can serve these purposes.
The paper by Athey and Bagwell (2001), for instance, touches upon the issue of
e¢ ciency. More precisely, it shows that, in order to achieve productive e¢ ciency, rms
exchange private information about their unit costs. By contrast, Compte (1998) and
Kandori and Matsushima (1998) explore the issue of sustainability in a setting where
each rms actions are privately observable and each rm receives a private and imper-
fect signal about rivalsplay. Both papers demonstrate that the exchange of private
information can help sustain collusion, provided that rms are su¢ ciently patient.8 In
a related study, Harrington and Skrzypacz (2011) address a similar question but in a
setting where rms hold private information about their prices and sales. Assuming
that monetary transfers are possible, the authors show that communication constitutes
an integral part of the mechanism that ensures the proper functioning of a cartel.
The current paper di¤ers from the literature in two respects. First, in all the
aforementioned papers it is assumed that communication is costless and the main issue
is how to induce truthful reporting. In contrast, in my model rms cannot distort the
reports but rather bear the costs of communication. Accordingly, the emphasis is
placed not on truthful reporting (which is guaranteed by the assumption), but on the
most e¢ cient use of the limited information.
Second, the paper also di¤ers in the way collusion is uncovered by the competition
authorities. The literature typically treats the incriminating evidence as a black box
or rather it assumes that collusion can be inferred from price observations. Either
approach seems of little relevance for policy implications.9 In contrast, my model
builds on the idea that the revealed evidence of communication is the main proof of
collusive behavior. Consequently, in such a setting monitoring of prices is sensible
insofar it helps to predict when collusive rms are more likely to communicate.
The closest paper to mine is perhaps Martin (2006) who pursues a somewhat
similar approach. There are however two important di¤erences. In his model, collusion
with communication is an assumption while, in mine, it is derived as part of the
7See also Kuhn (2001) for the detailed discussion of how collusive rms can benet from a particular
type of information exchange.
8Although both papers show that the collusive scheme can involve communication, one question
remains unsolved. As the authors themselves acknowledge, they fail to characterize the collusive
scheme without communication and, as such, evaluate the benets of communication.
9The Wood Pulp Case (OJL 85/1, 1985) clearly illustrates the point. In this case the Commission
brought forward the enormous evidence of almost simultaneous price increases but failed to provide
the evidence of explicit cooperation. Thus, much of the decision hinged upon the interpretation of the
parallel behavior. While the Commission tried to prove that it was a consequence of collusion, the
court did not accept its arguments on the grounds that it was equally consistent with independent
and individually rational responses of rms in the market environment.
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optimal collusive strategy. Additionally, in contrast to my approach, he assumes that
competition enforcement relies on price observations while abstracting from the nature
of the evidence of collusion.
3 Framework
Consider a setting in which n  2 identical rms produce a homogeneous good at
xed cost k > 0 and constant marginal cost which is normalized to zero, without loss
of generality. Firms engage in repeated Cournot competition over an innite time
horizon t 2 f0; 1; ::g: Specically, in period t rm i chooses the quantity qit to supply
to the market. Given the total quantity supplied Qt =
Pn
i=1 qit; the market clears at
the price:
pt(Qt) = maxf0; a+ "t  Qtg; (1)
where "t is the demand shock realized in period t and a > 0: The shocks are indepen-
dent across the time and uniformly distributed over the interval [ ;]: The parame-
ter  measures the degree of demand uncertainty and is such that 0 <  < a=(n+1):
The latter inequality implies that in competitive equilibrium rms face a positive mar-
ket price even if the lowest-demand state is realized.
For a given prole of quantities supplied (q1t; ::; qnt); rm i obtains the expected
prot:10
ei (q1t; ::; qnt) =
 
a  nj=1qjt

qit   k:
If rms could coordinate their decisions so as to maximize the total industry prot,
then each of them would produce the quantity qm = argmaxq ei (q; ::; q) = a=2n and
earn the expected prot m = n(qm)2  k: In contrast, in the static Nash equilibrium
each rm would produce the quantity qn = a=(n + 1) and earn the expected prot
n = (qn)2   k:
Following the approach of Green and Porter (1984), rms are assumed to observe
only their own output levels and realized market prices. Since the main obstacle for
collusion in this setting is the lack of perfect knowledge about each others behavior,
then rms could only facilitate collusion by exchanging private information about the
exact quantities supplied.11 However, as was discussed in the Introduction, the costs
associated with exchanging such information prevent them from systematically doing
so. For the sake of exposition, it will be assumed that the costs are due to antitrust
10Hereinafter, it will be used repeatedly that the expected value of " is zero.
11 If rms could manipulate the data, then there would be no scope for meaningful communication.
This is because the information being exchanged refers to the past and, as such, it cannot a¤ect rms
current and future prots. Consequently, little can be done to elicit it truthfully.
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enforcement. More precisely, it will be assumed that in every period the competition
authority chooses an industry at random and conducts an audit on a regular basis.
In case it nds that rms have met and exchanged information about the individual
output levels, it levies nes against each rm participated in the meeting.12
To formalize matters, denote by D  fM;Ng the set of decision variables (which is
common to all rms) where M means that a rm proposes to meet and N means that
it does not do so. Also, denote by P = [0; a+] the set of feasible price realizations
and by Q = [0; Q] the set of feasible output levels where Q  a+:
Repeated interaction between rms is modeled as an innitely repeated game
G1() dened by the component game G and the common discount factor  2 (0; 1):
The one-period game G in turn is dened as follows:
Stage 1. Each rm i makes a decision di 2 D: After all the decisions having been
made, they become commonly known. The meeting takes place only if all rm agree
on this, i.e., only if di = M for all i: In which case, they disclose private information
about the exact outputs produced in the past. If the meeting does not take place,
neither rm can access private information about the rivalsoutput levels.
Stage 2. Each rm i produces an output qi 2 Q; the shock " is realized, and the
market price p 2 P becomes publicly observable.
Stage 3. The competition authority audits the industry. If the meeting has taken
place, it detects the meeting with the probability  2 (0; 1) and levies the xed ne F
against each rm attended the meeting.13 Otherwise, it nds no evidence of collusion
and levies no nes.
Stage 4. The prots are obtained.
The timing of the game G thus implies that, upon entering every single period,
each rm observes the history of its own output levels, the realized market prices,
the rivals decisions regarding the meetings and the rivals output levels disclosed
during the meetings. Denote by I  f?g [ Qn 1 the information set available to
each rm in each period t  1 which represents its knowledge of the rivalsoutput
levels produced in period t   1; the sign ? means that a rm lacks any relevant
information.14 Denote also by Ht  Qt 1  Dn(t 1)  It 1  Pt 1 the history up to
date t  1 and by H0 the null history. A strategy i for each rm i species a sequence
12The model thus abstracts from any reason to communicate other than facilitate collusion.
13 In general, the ne F can vary with the total output Q: For example, it can be proportional to the
damage caused to consumers. Alternatively, it can be associated with the foregone prots from the
breakdown of collusion for a number of periods. The implicit assumption here is that rms neglect
the relationship between Q and F because, say, it might be di¢ cult to predict the judgement of court.
An explicit account for a functional relationship between Q and F is the subject for future research.
14Note that I  f?g at t = 0 since there is nothing to disclose yet.
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of pair functions it  (dit; qit) dened for each period t such that dit : Ht  ! D and
qit : Ht  Dn  ! Q: A strategy prole  comprises the strategies of all rms and
writes as  = (1; :::; n): For a given ; rm i obtains the expected payo¤:15
Vi(i;  i) = (1  )
1X
t=0
tvi(it;  it);
where vi(it;  it) = ei (q1t; q it)   F if d1t = :: = dnt = M and vi(it;  it) =
ei (q1t; q it) otherwise.
Following the approach of Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994), the paper will
consider those sequential equilibria in which in every single period rms condition their
play on the history of the commonly observed variables only. Such strategies are called
public strategies and such sequential equilibria are called perfect public equilibria.
Furthermore, the analysis will focus on fully symmetric perfect public equilibria in
which rms use the same continuation strategy, i.e., it = t for all i:
Denote by  = (; :::; ) (respectively, by = (; :::; )) the equilibrium strategy
prole which yields the maximal payo¤ V (respectively, the minimal payo¤ V ) in the
game G1(): Dene the outcome path Z = f(dt; qMt ; qNt )g1t=0 generated by  where
qMt and q
N
t are the outputs produced by each rm in period t; given that in this period
the meeting has and has not been held, respectively. The outcome path Z generated
by  can be dened in a similar way.
Denote by e(z; q) the expected prot of rm i; by peq(z) the expected market price
and by Pq(z) the set of prices that can occur with positive probability in the case
where rm i produces the quantity z while each other rm j produces the quantity q;
i.e.,
e(z; q) = ei (z; q; ::; q);
peq(z) = a  z   (n  1)q;
Pq(z) = [peq(z) ; peq(z) + ]:
Let e(q)  e(q; q); peq  peq(q) and Pq  Pq(q): It is straightforward to verify
that e(q) ? e(z; q) for any z 7 q < qn: This property will be used repeatedly in the
subsequent analysis.
Note that in the present setting communication can enhance collusion in two re-
spects.
 First, it can allow rms to sustain harsher punishments. In which case, even
15The subscript  idenotes the vector of the decision variables chosen by all rms except rm i:
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if it does occur along the equilibrium path, yet it can make collusion easier to
sustain.
 Second, it can allow rms to better detect deviations from the collusive output.
In which case, it can facilitate collusion even if in the punishment phase rms
abandon it for whatever reasons.
Since the goal of the paper is to examine the second e¤ect, the exact value of the
punishment is not important. For this reason, a technical assumption is made.
Assumption 1. k = (qn)2 :
It states that the static Nash equilibrium yields zero prots. Given that the minmax
payo¤ is also zero, this implies that the strategy  takes a particularly simple form: in
each period produce qn and propose no communication whatsoever. As a result, one
can restrict attention to those equilibria in which in each period rms produce less
than qn:
4 Optimal collusive strategy
Since at t = 0 there is nothing to reveal yet, while meeting is costly, the optimal
collusive strategy  must specify no meeting at t = 0: As Appendix A shows, it must
also specify that in each period rms produce the same output q regardless of the
meeting, i.e., q  qMt = qNt for all t; and meet only when the market price falls within
the target range of prices [peq  ; p]; which is the same for all periods. Furthermore,
in case they detect any deviation from q or in case some rm waives the meeting
when it must be held, it requires rms to switch to the worst sustainable punishment.
Formally, the strategy  is of the form:
 In period t = 0 propose no meeting and produce q;
 In each period t  1 proceed as follows:
 if pt 1 2 (p; peq +]; then propose no meeting and produce q;
 if pt 1 2 [peq  ; p]; then propose to meet;
 if the meeting has taken place and it has revealed that each rm pro-
duced q in period t  1; then produce q;
 otherwise produce qn and play  from the next period onwards;
 if pt 1 =2 [peq  ; peq +]; then play  from this period onwards.
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The strategy  is thus characterized by the collusive output q and the trigger price
p: Specically, q determines both the value of the collusive prot e(q) and the set
of prices Pq = [peq   ; peq + ] that can occur with positive probability along the
equilibrium path, while p determines the set of prices [peq  ; p] that trigger the need
for a meeting.
Denote by  the probability for rms to meet in each period t  1; i.e.,
 = Prfp 2 [peq  ; p]g =
p  peq +
2
:
Since, for a given q; there is one-to-one relationship between p and ; in what
follows the equilibrium will be characterized in terms of (; q) rather than (p; q) :
Consider the outcome path Z induced by the strategy prole  and choose some
period t in which rms are supposed to meet. Denote by V
M
t the average discounted
value of the stream of the expected payo¤s generated by Z from period t onwards. For
period t0 in which rms are not supposed to meet, dene V
N
t0 in a similar way. Since
the strategy  is stationary, then V
N
t = V
N
and V
M
t = V
M
for all t: In which case, it
is straightforward to verify that V
N
and V
M
are related as follows:
V
N
= (1  )e(q) + (VM + (1  )V N );
V
M
= (1  )(e(q)  F e) + (VM + (1  )V N );
where F e  F: Solving the above system of equations yields:
V
N
= e(q)   F e; (2)
V
M
= V
N   (1  )F e: (3)
For  to be an equilibrium strategy, it must be immune to all possible deviations.
Consider rst deviations in which a rm defects from the collusive output. Note that,
if  = 1; then all such deviations will systematically be detected while, if  < 1;
then some of them will likely to pass unnoticed. Given this, it will prove useful to
distinguish between open and hidden deviations.
In the open deviation a rm clearly reveals that it has cheated. Since cheating
can be revealed either by the price realization or by the meeting, it will certainly be
detected if it induces zero probability for the realized price to fall within the set of
prices, (p; peq+] triggering no communication. This implies that in the open deviation
a rm must produce the output z such that the new set of admissible price realizations
Pq(z) does not overlap with the set (p; peq +]: Given that rms switch to the worst
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continuation equilibrium following the realization of any p =2 (p; peq+]; such deviation
will be unprotable only if:
(1  )e(z; q)  V N : (4)
Substituting (2) into (4) and rearranging the terms yields:
(1  ) (e(z; q) e(q))  (e(q)  F e); (5)
where z is such that either peq(z) +   p or peq(z)  peq > 2:
In contrast, in the hidden deviation a rm seeks to reduce the likelihood of detection
of cheating. Towards that end, it produces the output z 6= q such that, with some
positive probability, the realized price will fall within the interval (p; peq + ]: Since
this is possible only if the set Pq(z) overlaps with the set (p; peq + ]; z must satisfy
either p < peq(z) +  < p
e
q + or p
e
q(z)  peq < 2: The former condition implies that
0 < z   q < peq +  p while the latter implies that 0 < q   z  2: In either case, z
must di¤er only marginally from q:
Denote by (z) the probability for any such deviation to be detected, i.e., (z) =
Prfp =2 (p; peq +]g: It is straightforward to verify that, if peq(z)  peq < 2; then:
(z) = +
maxf0; peq(z)  p g
2
;
while, if p < peq(z) + ; then:
(z) = +
peq   peq(z)
2
: (6)
Since all detected deviation are followed by the worst sustainable punishment, the
hidden deviation will be unprotable only if:
(1  )e(z; q) + (1  (z))V N  (1  )e(q) + 

V
M
+ (1  )V N

; (7)
which, in particular, implies:
(1  ) (e(z; q) e(q))  

V
M
+ ((z)  )V N

:
Note that, since (z)   and e(z; q) < e(q) for all z < q(< qn); the above
condition is trivially satised for all z < q: Thus, in considering (7) it su¢ ces to restrict
attention to z > q: In which case, substituting (2) and (3) into (7) and rearranging
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the terms yields:
(1  ) (e(z; q) e(q)) + (1  (z))V N  (e(q)  F e); (8)
where z is such that 0 < z   q < peq +  p and (z) is given by (6) :
For given ; (5) and (8) characterize the set of collusive outputs that can be sus-
tained in equilibrium. Although these conditions are formally dened for di¤erent z;
one can neglect this di¤erence while considering them simultaneously. The intuition
suggests (and it is proven in Appendix A) that, of the two conditions, (5) is stronger
for large output deviations, while the reverse holds for marginal ones. In other words,
(5) and (8) are compatible for z  q: Thus, taken together, they can be written as:16
max
z  q
e(z; q) e(q)  
e(q)  F e
1   ; (OD)
max
z q

e(z; q) e(q) +  1  (z)
1   V
N

 
e(q)  F e
1   ; (HD)
where (z) is given by (6) :
Conditions (OD) and (HD) have simple interpretation: the short-term gain from
deviating from the collusive output q must not exceed the expected loss from abandon-
ing collusion forever afterwards. In this setting, the gains from deviating are twofold.
First, given that in Cournot competition outputs act as strategic substitutes, a devi-
ator may gain from increasing its output level. In this respect, (OD) ensures that q
is immune to all open deviations while (HD) ensures that it is immune to all hidden
ones. In the former case, a rm best responds to q while, in the latter, it suboptimally
increases its output, so that when market demand is high the price mimics a somewhat
lower demand state.
Second, given that any detected deviation causes a breakdown of collusion, a de-
viator may gain from saving on the cost of communication necessarily borne in the
collusive phase. More precisely, it then avoids paying F e in all subsequent periods
which adds up to saving the amount F e=(1  ): This is possible because of the par-
ticular form of the punishment considered here, namely, a reversal to the static Nash
equilibrium. Although it yields zero payo¤, it involves no communication whatsoever.
Consider now the deviation in which a rm waives the meeting when it must be
held. Since it is always revealed before rms set their output levels, it can be more
immediately punished. But even though rms respond to it by playing the static Nash
equilibrium, still it may be protable because it allows the deviator to save on the cost
16 If  = 1; all deviations are detected with certainty, in which case, only (OD) must be satised.
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of communication. Thus, each rm will refrain from waiving the meeting only if:
0  (1  )(e(q)  F e) + 

V
M
+ (1  )V N

;
which yields (using (2) and (3)):
0  VM = e(q)  (1   + )F e; (WM)
where  > 0:17
Note that, by using (2) ; (3) ; (6) and peq   peq(z) = z   q; (HD) can be written as:
max
z q

e(z; q) e(q)  z   q
2

1   V
N

 
1   V
M
: (9)
Since the left hand side of the above condition is always non-negative, (WM) is
satised whenever (9) is satised. Thus, it can be omitted in the subsequent analysis.
Conditions (OD) and (HD) are necessary for the existence of equilibrium in which
rms maintain their outputs at the level of q; and hold meetings on occasion. Appendix
A shows that these conditions are also su¢ cient. This leads to:
Proposition 1 The strategy  (; q) is the optimal collusive strategy wherein (; q)
solves the following problem:
(; q) = argmax
; q
e(q)  F e
s:t: (OD) and (HD) hold.
(P1)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The result has two sides to it: rst, rms hold meetings only when the market price
falls somewhat below the trigger price and, second, they never revert to a temporary
punishment phase. The rst feature is similar to the pattern of collusive behavior
obtained in Green and Porter (1984) in the sense that, in both models, rms have
to take costly action when the market experiences a price decrease. More precisely,
in Green and Porter they revert to a temporary price war while here they engage in
costly communication. In either case, though the rmsreactions are di¤erent, they
aim to deter potential deviations from the collusive output.
To gain the intuition for why rms nd it optimal to apply a "tail-type" test in
choosing whether to meet, suppose instead that they choose to do so when the price
falls within the interval [p0; p0] where p0 > peq   and p0 < peq +: In which case, the
17 If  = 0; then (WM) is irrelevant.
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probability of communication would be given by:
0 =
p0   p0
2
:
Consider a deviation in which a rm marginally increases its output z: Assuming
that z is such that p0 < peq(z) +  < p
0; the probability of detection of such deviation
would be given by:

0
(z) =
peq(z) +   p0
2
+
peq   peq(z)
2
:
In the above expression, the rst term captures the probability that the deviation
will be revealed during the meeting while the second one captures the probability that
it will be revealed by the price realization. Note that 0 depends only on the di¤erence
p0   p0 while 0(z) increases, as p0 decreases. Thus, by decreasing p0 and p0 while
keeping constant the di¤erence p0   p0; rms could only increases the probability of
detection of deviations without changing the cost of communication. Appendix A also
shows that, in the case of other values of z; doing so would change neither 0 nor 
0
(z):
As a result, with the tail-type rule applied to the range of admissible price realizations
Pq; rms can do at least as well as with any other rule determining when they must
hold a meeting.
The second feature of the collusive strategy obtained here contrasts with the pattern
of collusive behavior obtained in Green and Porter. In their setting, communication is
not allowed and deviations can never be detected. Consequently, occasional reversions
to a price war are needed in order to deter potential deviations. By contrast, in
the present setting rms are given the opportunity to communicate which induces a
positive probability for any deviation to be detected.18 Furthermore, since all detected
deviations are most severely punished, the threat of triggering the punishment phase
su¢ ces to remove any temptation to deviate. As a result, along the equilibrium path
rms maintain the agreed output levels and the meetings just conrm adherence to
this agreement.19
18More precisely, deviations can also be detected by the price realizations which fall outside the
target set of prices Pq : This feature is due to the particular distribution of the demand shocks
considered here, and it would disappear if  were large enough. For example, if it were   peq ; then
rms would meet after realization of any p  p: Hence, it does not alter the qualitative results of the
model.
19This may seem at odd with the stylized evidence provided by Genesove and Mullin (2001) who
argue that cartel meetings do reveal cheating. However, an important feature of their account of cartel
organization is that meetings were used not only for detection of deviations but also for renegotiation
of retaliation. Since the latter is not allowed in the model, it will only be costly for a cheating rm
to attend the meeting.
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To better understand how communication facilitates collusion, it will prove useful
to consider the situation where rms are not allowed to communicate.
Benchmark: tacit collusion. Denote by b the best collusive strategy in this case.
Note that the strategy b can be obtained by using the previous analysis. Specically,
it can be regarded as the strategy  which species no meetings along the equilibrium
path. As a result, b takes a particularly simple form: produce bq as long as p 2 Pbq;
otherwise produce qn forever afterwards.
To establish the equilibrium conditions, suppose that all rms adopt the strategy
 (b; bq) wherein b = 0: Since, by construction, no meeting is ever held, condition (WM)
is irrelevant. Next, condition (OD) takes the form that looks like the one obtained in
the standard deterministic models, i.e.,
max
z
e(z; bq) e(bq)  
1  
e(bq): (ODtc)
The probability of detection of deviations (which are now revealed only if the
realized price falls outside the target set of prices Pbq) is equal to:
b(z) = pebq   pebq(z)
2
=
z   bq
2
:
Using the above expression and b = 0; (HD) can be written as:
e(z; bq) e(bq)  
1  
z   bq
2
e(bq);
where z is such that 0  z   bq  2: The above condition implies that all marginal
deviations will be deterred only if:
2(n+ 1)(qn   bq)  
1  
e(bq): (HDtc)
As before, it can be shown that conditions (ODtc) and (HDtc) (where superscript
means tacit collusion) are necessary and su¢ cient for b to be an equilibrium strategy.
This leads to:
Proposition 2 The strategy b (bq) is the optimal collusive strategy without communi-
cation wherein bq solves the following problem:
bq = argmax
q
e(q)
s:t: (ODtc) and (HDtc) hold.
(P2)
The proof follows the same steps as for Proposition 1 and, hence, it is omitted.
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Denote by bqo (respectively, by bqh) the lowest quantity for which (ODtc) (respec-
tively, (HDtc)) is binding. The following proposition establishes the key features of
the strategy b.
Proposition 3 Suppose that collusive rms do not communicate and punish all de-
tected deviations by a reversal to the static Nash equilibrium forever. Then:
(i) There exists a threshold bmin 2 (0; 1) such that they can sustain collusion if and
only if   bmin;
(ii) There exist b1 and b2 such that bmin < b1  b2 < 1 and bq is given by:
bq =
8><>:
bqh; if  2 [bmin;b1);bqo; if  2 [b1;b2);
qm; if  2 [b2; 1);
(iii) b1 < b2 if  < a(n  1)=16n and b1 = b2; otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix B:
The proposition, in particular, implies that it is always the hidden deviations that
do not allow rms to collude when they are su¢ ciently impatient. Intuitively, in
the open deviation a rm optimally responds to the collusive output. This yields a
large one-period gain but induces the retaliation for sure. In contrast, in the hidden
deviation a rm only suboptimally responds to the collusive output. This in turn
yields a lower one-period gain but induces the likelihood for such a deviation to pass
unnoticed. When the discount factor is small enough, the gains are almost the same.20
As a result, the hidden deviations are more protable in this case.
Another noteworthy feature of the proposition is that the open deviations can
impede tacit collusion only for moderate values of the discount factor and only when the
variance of the demand shocks is su¢ ciently small. This is again quite intuitive: a less
uncertain environment increases the probability of detection of the hidden deviations
and thereby makes them less protable in compared to the open ones.
Communication as facilitating device. One can now characterize the impact
of communication on collusion. To begin, suppose that the scope for tacit collusion
is limited by the open deviations (i.e., bq = bqo): In which case, even if rms could
communicate, they would optimally refrain from doing so.21 This is because the most
20When the scope for collusion is too limited, even the optimal response involves only a slight
modication of the collusive output.
21Note that (OD) is stronger than (ODtc) for any  > 0; while both conditions are equivalent
for  = 0: Hence, e(q)  e(bqo) for any (; q) satisfying (OD) which a fortiori implies that
e(q)   F e  e(bqo):
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protable deviations are those which are already detected with probability one. Ac-
cordingly, as long as such deviations are deterred, each rm correctly anticipates that
its fellow members will comply with the collusive agreement. This makes communica-
tion useless. Consequently, it does not pay for rms to bear the cost of the meetings.
The analysis thus implies that it is only when the scope for tacit collusion is limited
by the hidden deviations that rms can benet from communication. Specically, we
have:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the solution to (P2) is such that (HDtc) is binding. Then:
(i) There exists a threshold of the legal penalty F such that the strategy  yields a larger
expected payo¤ than the strategy b does whenever F e  F ; and it yields a lower expected
payo¤ otherwise;
(ii) F  m and F is an increasing function of ; provided that  is large enough
and n  12:
Proof. See Appendix C:
The proposition thus implies that when the hidden deviations constrain rms from
making collusive prots, communication enables them to further enhance these prots,
even though it involves the risk of exposure to legal sanctions. Note that the proposi-
tion does not require the legal penalty to be small, rather it su¢ ces that it does not
exceed a certain level which tends to increase as demand volatility rises. This is quite
intuitive: a more noisy environment renders deviations more protable which requires
rms to meet more often in order to stabilize the cartel. Consequently, a larger penalty
is needed to prevent them from doing so. In particular, as the proposition shows, the
penalty can even exceed the level of the monopoly prot when demand uncertainty is
large enough.22
Since the meetings aim to monitor adherence to the collusive strategy, they reduce
the scope for deviations and thereby allow rms to further restrict their outputs (i.e.,
to sustain q lower than bqh): However, in choosing the frequency of meetings, ; they
face a trade-o¤between additional prots to be gained from an increase in the intensity
of monitoring and the increased risk that collusion might then be uncovered by the
competition authority. On balance, communication will improve collusive prots only
if:
e(q)  F e > e(bqh):
The above condition is readily satised for F e small enough. Indeed, as Proposition
3 implies, (ODtc) must necessarily be slack for bq = bqh: Since the functions e(q) and
22Arguably, this is due to the implicit assumption that rms are not liquidity constrained.
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e(z; q) are continuous with respect to their arguments, there must exist q such that
q < bqh and the following condition holds:
max
z
e(z; q) e(q) <

1  
e(q):
Denote by 
tch the set of the discount factors for which the solution to (P2) implies
that (HDtc) is binding. By Proposition 3, 
tch = [bmin;b1): For any  2 
tch ; dene F
as follows:
F  e(q) max

e(bqh); 1  


max
z
e(z; q) e(q)

:
One can verify that when F e < inffF :  2 
tch g there always exists an equilibrium
in which rms meet in every period (i.e., set  = 1) and maintain their outputs at the
level of q: By construction, in this equilibrium each rm obtains the expected payo¤
e(q)  F e > e(bqh): Thus, the issue is how much F e needs to be small in order for
explicit collusion to be more protable.
In particular, if bqh is such that e(bqh)   (1   )F e > 0; then in explicit collusion
rms can obtain more than e(bqh) by reducing their outputs just slightly below bqh
and inducing a small probability of communication. To show this, let q < bqh and  be
given by:
 =
e(q) e(bqh)
F e
: (10)
It su¢ ces to establish that the outcome (; q) ; as dened above, is sustainable.23
Note rst that, for  given by (10) ; the opportunity cost of waiving the meeting is
equal to:
e(q)  (1   + )F e = e(bqh)  (1  )F e > 0;
which ensures that (WM) is always satised. Next, since (ODtc) is not binding forbq = bqh; (OD) must be satised for  su¢ ciently small and q slightly lower than bq:
Finally, using (6) and V
N
= e(q)  F e = e(bqh); (HD) can be written as:
max
z q

e(z; q) e(q)  p
e
q   peq(z)
2
e(bqh)
1  

(11)
 
1   (
e(bqh)  (1  )F e) :
23 In which case, by continuity, there always exists a sustainable outcome (; q) which yields an
expected payo¤ strictly larger than e(bqh):
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Note that, since q > qm; then @=@q = (F e) 1@e(q)=@q < 0: Moreover, since
(HDtc) is binding for bq = bqh; the following conditions must also hold:
max
z q

e(z; q) e(q)  p
e
q   peq(z)
2
e(bqh)
1  

q= bqh = 0;
@
@q
max
z q

e(z; q) e(q)  p
e
q   peq(z)
2
e(bqh)
1  

q= bqh = 0:
Taken together, the above conditions imply that (11) must be satised for some q
slightly lower than bqh:
In contrast, if bqh is such that e(bqh)   (1   )F e  0; then, in order for explicit
collusion to be more protable, rms must considerably reduce their output levels. The
analysis is more involved, since not only (HD) but also (OD) must then be treated
carefully. As Appendix C shows, even in this case, with communication rms are able
to achieve greater collusive prots, provided that the legal penalty does not exceed the
level of F :
Consider now the other side of Proposition 3, viz. the inability of rms to sustain
tacit collusion for low values of the discount factor, i.e., for  < bmin: As was explained
above, this is because for those discount factors they are unable to deter the hidden de-
viations. Note however that (HDtc) is binding for  = bmin: In which case, Proposition
4 implies that rms could instead sustain explicit collusion, provided that F e  F :
Furthermore, given that conditions (OD) and (HD) are continuous with respect to ;
this must also hold true for some  < bmin but close enough to bmin: The following
proposition conrms the intuition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that F e < F: Then, there exists a threshold min 2 (0;bmin)
such that explicit collusion is sustainable if and only if   min:
Proof. See Appendix D:
The proposition thus implies that, even though communication can help restore
the scope for collusion in markets where collusion would not be sustainable otherwise,
yet it cannot make collusion sustainable when rms are too impatient.
To gain the intuition behind the result obtained, it is useful to distinguish between
the deterrence e¤ect and the value diminishing e¤ect of communication. In the rst
case, communication reduces the incentives to deviate by increasing the probability of
detection of deviations while, in the second case, it reduces the value of collusion by
exposing rms to the risk of legal punishment. It turns out that, even though the rst
e¤ect relaxes the incentive constraints and thereby enlarges the scope for collusion,
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yet the second e¤ect renders collusion unprotable when the discount factor is small
enough.
5 Frequency of meetings
Although the importance of communication in collusion was recognized long ago, the
literature has somehow neglected a number of related issues. How often do rms
communicate? Which factors, if any, can inuence the frequency of communication?
Does it depend on matters to be discussed? This section aims to provide insights into
these questions. However, since a closed form solution to problem (P1) cannot be
explicitly derived, it is not possible to determine analytically how it varies with the
parameters ; ; F e and n: For this reason, simulations are performed for particular
values of these parameters.
Since  is the probability for rms to meet in every single period, it is natural to
consider it as a measure of the frequency of the meetings (the inverse of  is then the
mean time between two consecutive meetings). Figure 1 displays the graphs of  as a
function of  calculated for di¤erent values of n while holding  and F e xed. Figure
2 displays the graphs of the same function calculated for di¤erent values of  while
holding n and F e xed.24
[Insert Figures 1 and 2]
In the gures, each graph is drawn on the interval [min; ] where  is the mini-
mal discount factor for which collusive rms are able to sustain the fully integrated
monopoly outcome without communication. In each case, the parameter  has been
chosen such that the sustainability of tacit collusion be constrained by the hidden
deviations only, i.e.,  > (n  1)=16n; as implied by Proposition 3.
From inspection of Figure 1 it follows that, as n increases, the graph of  shifts
rightward and min becomes larger. This suggests that the conventional view (often
justied in terms of a Nash equilibrium in an innitely repeated game in which com-
munication is per se irrelevant) that collusion is easier to sustain the fewer rms are
in the market seems to hold even when they engage in meaningful communication. In
addition, the gure also shows that in the interval of s where all the functions are well
dened (e.g., in the interval from 0:70 to 0:81)  tends to increase, as n rises. Put it
di¤erently, rms tend to communicate more often, as a cartel grows in size. Intuitively,
in this case each rm obtains a lower market share and therefore it is more tempted
24 In each case  is obtained as a solution to (P1). The details of calculations are available upon
request.
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to deviate by marginally increasing its output. As a result, in order to discipline its
members, a cartel increases the intensity of monitoring.
Another noteworthy feature of Figures 1 and 2 is that the function  is non-
monotonic: it increases in the neighborhood of min and decreases otherwise. The
increasing part of  might be explained as follows. For the chosen values of the
parameters F e and  it is the hidden deviations that impede collusion when  is close
enough to min: In this case, rms can sustain collusion only by means of monitoring
of their private actions. As a result, they increase the frequency of meetings despite
the fact that doing so diminishes collusive prots.25 In contrast, when  is large
enough, they are less tempted to deviate which allows a cartel to reduce the intensity
of monitoring. This in turn explains the decreasing part of :
Lastly, Figure 2 suggests that  is an increasing function of the variance of the de-
mand shock : This again seems quite intuitive. A more noisy environment increases
the scope for deviations which makes collusion more di¢ cult to sustain. Consequently,
in order to enhance the sustainability collusion, more communication and more moni-
toring are required.
6 Concluding remarks
The paper argues that in a situation where the threat of legal prosecution constrains
collusive rms from meeting too often, they choose to do so only if the market price
falls somewhat below the target price. By using occasional meetings most e¢ ciently,
rms are still able to collude in a better way. More precisely, when collusion is already
somewhat e¤ective, the meetings allow rms to achieve greater collusive prots. Fur-
thermore, they allow rms to restore the scope for collusion in markets where collusion
would not be sustainable otherwise.
The paper also sheds light on the relationship between the frequency of meetings
and changes in market environment. In this regard, it delivers important implications
for more e¢ cient cartel detection. Specically, the results suggest that the competition
authorities should take into account that cartel participants tend to meet more often
in markets where they value future experiences to a lesser degree, they face greater
uncertainty or where cartels are bigger in size.
The model builds on the assumption that the probability distribution of the demand
shocks is uniform. As a result, the optimal collusive strategy, in this setting, requires
25Simulations also show that the increasing part of  disappears when  and/or F e is small enough.
In this case, both (HD) and (OD) rather than (HD) alone govern the sustainability of collusion. In
particular, since (OD) is easier to satisfy when  is smaller and/or  is larger, the function  is found
to be strictly decreasing on [min; ]:
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rms to apply a tail-type test in choosing whether to meet. Related to alternative
specications of uncertainty, my conjecture is that a similar strategy should also be
optimal for at least those probability distribution functions that satisfy the condition
that low prices are more likely to result from a large total output rather than a small
one.
The other simplifying assumption is that the competition authority just blindly
ghts collusion, i.e., it makes no use of either the actual level or the dynamics of prices.
Such an approach rules out any strategic interaction between rms and the competition
authority. An explicit account for this in a dynamic context is a challenging task, and
it is left for future research.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Consider equilibria in which rms condition their play only on the history of com-
monly observed variables, i.e., market prices, decisions to meet and each others output
levels disclosed during the meetings. Next, consider a history along the equilibrium
path leading to a period in which each rm is required to produce the output q: Given
that " is drawn from a bounded support, rms expect the realized price to fall within
the interval Pq: If instead it falls outside this interval, they infer with probability one
that cheating has occurred. But since the rm that has deviated can condition its con-
tinuation strategy on its output z 6= q; the other rms need to make conjectures about
its unobservable action. Moreover, since there is a possibility that they disagree on or
form incorrect beliefs about z; in the continuation game they can obtain the payo¤s
which are even lower than the ones that they would obtain in the worst sequential
equilibrium.
To avoid technical di¢ culties related to specication of beliefs in the event of
unexpected price realization, in what follows only those strategies which require rms
to revert forever to the static Nash equilibrium after the realization of any p =2 Pq
will be considered. This guarantees that the continuation-strategy prole is always
an equilibrium and therefore the methodology of Abreu et al. (1986, 1990) can be
applied.
Denote by VM (respectively, by VN ) the set of expected payo¤s generated by the
equilibrium strategies which necessarily require rms to meet (respectively, not to
meet) at period t = 0: Note that VN 6= ? because playing the static Nash equilibrium
in every period constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the game G1(): Note also that
VM 6= ? for F e = 0 because communication enables rms to replace an imperfect-
monitoring setting with a perfect-monitoring one. In which case, an equilibrium always
exists. Hence, VM 6= ? at least for su¢ ciently small values of F e: Finally, since meeting
is costly, then VM  VN :
Following Abreu et al. (1986, 1990), any equilibrium strategy can be factored into
the stage decision variables d 2 D and q 2 Q; and the corresponding continuation
payo¤ functions v(d) and V (p): The function v(d) 2 VN ensures that a rm will never
gain from waiving the meeting while the function V (p) 2 VN ensures that it will never
gain from deviating from the collusive output.
Consider a period on the equilibrium path in which rms are required to produce
the output q each. Note rst that V (p) = 0 for all p =2 Pq because the static Nash
23
equilibrium yields zero payo¤. Next, denote by PM  Pq the set of prices that trigger
the need for a meeting. Since, by assumption, the meeting will reveal the exact output
produced by each rm, the rms continuation payo¤ must also depend on whether
it has defected from q or not. Accordingly, denote by VMdev(p) 2 VN its continuation
payo¤ in case it has done so, and by VM (p) 2 VM its continuation payo¤ in case it has
not. Likewise, denote by PN  PqnPM the set of prices triggering no communication,
and by V N (p) 2 VN the rms continuation payo¤ in this case. It is implied that
VM (p) and VMdev(p) are dened for all p 2 PM while V N (p) is dened for all p 2 PN :
Consider now a deviation in which a rm produces an output z 6= q: Since, by
doing so, it induces the set of feasible price realizations Pq(z) 6= Pq; in what follows it
will prove useful to dene the set Oq(z)  Pq(z) \ Pq: By construction, Oq(z) is the
set of prices that can occur with positive probability regardless of whether the rm has
deviated or not. As for detection of deviations, three cases need to be distinguished.
In the rst case, p 2 Pq(z)nOq(z): Since Pq \ Pq(z)nOq(z) = ?; this implies that
p =2 Pq: In other words, the deviation will be revealed by the price realization. In the
second case, p 2 Pq(z) \ PM which implies that the deviation will be revealed during
the meeting if the rm chooses to attend it; otherwise, it will be revealed by its refusal
to do so. In the third case, p 2 Pq(z) \ PN which implies that the deviation will pass
undetected.
From the above discussion it follows that, if q is produced in some period on the
equilibrium path, it must satisfy:
(1  )e(q) +   E V N (p)jp 2 PN+ E VM (p)jp 2 PM  (A1)
 (1  )e(z; q)
+ 
 
E

V N (p)jp 2 Pq(z) \ PN

+ E

VMdev(p)jp 2 Pq(z) \ PM

;
for all z 2 Q:
Consider now a period on the equilibrium path in which rms are rst required
to meet and then produce the output q each. Given that a rms refusal to meet
is commonly known, the other rms can respond immediately to such deviation by
modifying their output levels. Denote by v 2 VN the continuation payo¤ of a rm
that refuses to attend the meeting when it must be held. Thus, it will never gain from
doing so only if:
(1  )(e(q)  F e) +   E VM (p)jp 2 PM + E V N (p)jp 2 PN  v: (A2)
Note that, without loss of generality, the set PM can be represented by collection
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of s  1 nonoverlapping intervals, i.e., PM = [si=1PMi where PMi = [pi; pi] for each i
and:
pq   < p1 < p1 < :::: < ps < ps < pq +: (A3)
Let p0 = p0  peq   ; ps+1 = ps+1  peq +  and (p)  p=2: For each
k = 0; :::; s+ 1 dene the functions:
k(PM ) 
s+1X
i=k
(pi   pi);
k(PM ) 
kX
i=0
(pi   pi):
Also, dene the indicator function:
Ifx2 [a;b]g =
(
1; if x 2 [a; b];
0; otherwise:
Denote by (PM )  E[p 2 PM ] the probability for rms to meet in the following
period. Using the expressions for k and k; one can show:
(PM ) = 0(PM ) = s+1(PM ):
Denote by (zjPM ) the probability of detection of the deviation in which a rm
produces an output z 6= q; i.e.,
(zjPM )  E[p 2 Pq(z)nOq(z) or p 2 Pq(z) \ PM ] = E[p =2 Pq(z) \ PN ]:
Depending on the value of z; two cases need to be distinguished. In the rst case, z
is such that
 peq   peq(z) > 2: This condition implies that Oq(z) = ? and, therefore,
(zjPM ) = 1; i.e., the deviation will be detected for sure. In the second case, z is such
that
 peq   peq(z)  2: This condition in turn implies that Oq(z) 6= ? and, therefore,
the deviation will be detected only with some positive probability. In particular, one
can verify that, if 0 < peq(z)  peq  2; then:
(zjPM ) = (peq(z)  peq) +
s+1P
k=1
k(PM )Ifpeq(z) 2 (pk 1; pk)g (A4)
+
sP
k=1
 
(pk   peq(z) + ) + k+1(PM )

Ifpeq(z) 2 [pk; pk]g;
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while, if 0 < peq   peq(z)  2; then:
(zjPM ) = (peq   peq(z)) +
s+1P
k=1
k 1(PM )Ifpeq(z)+2 (pk 1; pk)g (A5)
+
sP
k=1
 
(peq(z) +   pk) + k 1(PM )

Ifpeq(z)+2 [pk; pk]g:
Lemma A1. (zjPM ) > (PM ) for any z 6= q:
Proof. Note rst that (A3) implies that (PM ) < 1 and:
(pk   peq +) > k(PM ); (A6)
(peq +  pk) > k(PM ); (A7)
for any k  1: The conclusion thus follows immediately if  peq   peq(z) > 2; since in
this case (zjPM ) = 1:
Consider the case 0 < peq(z)  peq  2: Supposing that peq(z)  2 (pk 1; pk) for
some k  1 and using (A4) and (A6), we have:
(zjPM ) = (peq(z)  peq) + k(PM ) > (pk 1   peq +) + k(PM )
> k 1(PM ) + k(PM ) = (PM ):
Supposing instead that peq(z)    2 [pk; pk] for some k  1 and proceeding in a
similar way, we have:
(zjPM ) = (peq(z)  peq) + (pk   peq(z) + ) + k+1(PM )
= (pk   peq +) + k+1(PM ) > k(PM ) + k+1(PM ) = (PM ):
Finally, consider the case 0 < peq   peq(z)  2: Supposing that peq(z) +  2
(pk 1; pk) for some k  1 and using (A5) and (A7), we have:
(zjPM ) = (peq   peq(z)) + k 1(PM ) > (peq +  pk) + k 1(PM )
> k(PM ) + k 1(PM ) = (PM ):
Supposing instead that peq(z) +  2 [pk; pk] for some k  1 and proceeding in a
similar way, we have:
(zjPM ) = (peq   peq(z)) + (peq(z) +   pk) + k 1(PM )
= (peq +  pk) + k 1(PM ) > k(PM ) + k 1(PM ) = (PM ):
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This completes the proof. 
Denote by V
M
the greatest element of VM and by M = (M ; :::; M ) the strategy
prole generating V
M
: Likewise, denote by V
N
the greatest element of VN and by
N = (N ; :::; N ) the strategy prole generating V
N
: Note also that the lowest ele-
ment of VN is generated by the strategy prole  = (; :::; ) which involves playing
the static Nash equilibrium in every period.
Lemma A2. If in some period on the equilibrium path rms meet and produce the
output q each, then q must satisfy the following two conditions:
0  (1  )(e(q)  F e) + 

(PM )VM + (1  (PM ))V N

; (A8)
and
(1  ) (e(z; q) e(q))  

(PM )VM + ((zjPM )  (PM ))V N

; (A9)
for all z 2 Q:
Proof. By supposition, q satises (A1) and (A2). First, consider (A2). Using
VM (p)  VM ; V N (p)  V N and (PM ) = E[p 2 PM ]; we have:
E

VM (p)jp 2 PM + E V N (p)jp 2 PN  (PM )VM + (1  (PM ))V N : (A10)
Taken together, (A10) and v  0 imply that (A8) is satised whenever (A2) is
satised.
Consider now (A1). Note that it can be written as:
(1  ) (e(z; q) e(q))    DM +DN ; (A11)
where
DM  E VM (p)jp 2 PM   E VMdev(p)jp 2 Pq(z) \ PM  ;
DN  E V N (p)jp 2 PN  E V N (p)jp 2 Pq(z) \ PN
= E

V N (p)jp 2 PNnPq(z)

:
Depending on the value of z; it will prove useful to distinguish three cases.
Case 1. z is such that
 peq   peq(z) > 2: This condition implies that Oq(z) =
? and therefore Pq(z) \ PM = Pq(z) \ PN = ?: Substituting the latter conditions
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into the right hand side of (A11) and using (A10) yields:
(1  ) (e(z; q) e(q))    E VM (p)jp 2 PM + E V N (p)jp 2 PN
 

(PM )VM + (1  (PM ))V N

:
Since in this case (zjPM ) = 1; the above condition implies that (A9) is satised
whenever (A1) is satised.
Case 2. z is such that 0  peq(z)  peq  2: This condition, in particular, implies
that z  q: Since DM  0 and DN  0 while e(z; q)  e(q) for all z  q(< qn);
then (A11) is trivially satised. Note also that the same holds true for (A9) since, by
construction, (zjPM ) = (PM ) for z = q while, by lemma A1, (zjPM ) > (PM )
for z 6= q:
Case 3. z is such that 0 < peq   peq(z)  2: Note rst that VMdev(p)  0 and
VM (p)  VM imply:
DM  (PM )VM : (A12)
Next, suppose that peq(z)+ 2 (pk 1; pk) for some k: In which case, using V N (p) 
V
N
; we have:
DN =
sX
i=k
Z pi+1
pi
V N (p)
dp
2
+
Z pk
peq(z)+
V N (p)
dp
2
(A13)

 
sX
i=k
pi+1   pi
2
+
pk   peq(z) 
2
!
V
N
:
On the other hand, using (PM ) = k(PM )+k 1(PM ); ps+1 = peq+ and (A5),
one can show:
(zjPM )  (PM ) = (ps+1   peq(z) )  k(PM )
=
sX
i=k
pi+1   pi
2
+
pk   peq(z) 
2
:
Substituting the above condition into (A13) yields:
DN  ((zjPM )  (PM ))V N : (A14)
Finally, suppose that peq(z) +  2 [pk; pk] for some k: By proceeding in a similar
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way, we have:
DN =
sX
i=k
Z pi+1
pi
V N (p)
dp
2

 
sX
i=k
pi+1   pi
2
!
V
N
: (A15)
Likewise, using (PM ) = k(PM ) + k 1(PM ); ps+1 = peq + and (A5), one can
show:
(zjPM )  (PM ) = (ps+1   pk)  k(PM ) =
sX
i=k
pi+1   pi
2
:
As before, substituting the above condition into (A15) yields (A14). To complete
the proof, note that (A11), (A12) and (A14), taken together, imply that (A9) is
satised whenever (A1) is satised. 
Lemma A3. Suppose that (A8) and (A9) are satised for some q: Then, there
always exists an equilibrium in which in some period on the equilibrium path rms
meet and produce the output q each.
Proof. Consider the following strategy M :
 In period t = 0 propose to meet; produce q if the meeting has been held, otherwise
produce qn and play  from the next period onwards;
 In period t = 1 play N if p 2 PN ; play M if p 2 PM ; and play  otherwise.
If a rm adheres to this strategy, it will obtain the expected payo¤:
(1  )(e(q)  F e) + 

(PM )VM + (1  (PM ))V N

:
In contrast, if it deviates by waiving the meeting, it will save on F e but obtain
zero payo¤s in all the subsequent periods. Hence, it will refrain from doing so only if
(A8) is satised. If instead it deviates by producing an output z 6= q; it will obtain
the expected payo¤:
(1  )(e(z; q)  F e) + (1  (zjPM ))V N :
Hence, it will refrain from doing so only if (A9) is satised. 
Corollary A1. (A8) and (A9) are necessary and su¢ cient conditions for rms to
meet and produce the output q each in any period on the equilibrium path.
Dene the set ePM = [si=1 ePMi where ePMi = PMi for each i 6= k and ePMk = [epk; epk]
where epk = pk   ; epk = pk    and 0 <   pk 1   pk: By construction, ePM di¤ers
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from PM only in that the interval [epk; epk] is shifted leftward relative to the interval
[pk; p
k] while keeping constant the length of this interval.
Since p is uniformly distributed on the interval Pq; the value of  depends only
on the sum of the lengths of the intervals PM1 ; : : : ;PMs : Hence, (PM ) = ( ePM ): In
contrast, the value of  also depends on the location of these intervals. Specically,
we have:
Lemma A4. (zj ePM )  (zjPM ) for all z > q:
Proof. Since (zj ePM ) di¤ers from (zjPM ) only on [epk; pk]; then (zj ePM ) =
(zjPM ) for all z such that peq(z) +  =2 [epk; pk]: In contrast, for all z such that
peq(z) +  2 [epk; pk] we have (using (A5)):
(zj ePM )  (zjPM ) =
8><>:
(peq(z) +   epk); if peq(z) +  2 [epk; pk);
(pk   epk); if peq(z) +  2 [pk; epk];
(pk   peq(z) ); if peq(z) +  2 (epk; pk];
which implies that (zj ePM )  (zjPM ): 
In the proof of Lemma A2 it was shown that a rm might gain only from those
output deviations in which it increases its output level. On the other hand, by Lemma
A4, rms can only increase the probability of detection of such deviations if they choose
to meet when the price falls within the set ePM rather than when it falls within the
set PM : This yields:
Corollary A2. In solving for the optimal collusive strategy, one can restrict at-
tention to the set of prices triggering communication which has the form PM = [p0; p]
where p0 = peq   and p = p0 +
Ps
i=1(p
i   pi):
For PM = [peq   ; p] denote (p; q)  (PM ) and (zj p; q)  (zjPM ): Using
(PM ) = E[p 2 PM ]; we have (p; q) = (p  peq +) while, using (A5), we have:
(zj p; q) = (peq   peq(z)) + (2 + peq(z)  peq)Ifpeq(z)+2 [peq ; p]g
+(p+  peq)Ifpeq(z)+2 (p; peq+)g:
Note that since, for given  and q; p is uniquely dened (i.e., p = 2+ peq  );
then the outcome in every single period on the equilibrium path can be characterized
in terms of  and q rather than p and q:
Dene the function:
b(zj; q)  + (peq   peq(z)) = 1  bz(; q)  z2 ;
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where bz(; q)  q + 2(1  ):
Using the expressions for (zj p; q) and b(zj; q); one can verify:
(zj; q)  (zj p; q)jp=2+peq  = minf1; b(zj; q)g:
Dene the functions:
Go(zj q)  e(z; q) e(q); (A16)
Gh(zj; q)  Go(zj q) + 
1  

1  b(zj; q)V N ; (A17)
Using the expressions for e(z; q) and b(zj; q); one can verify:
(i) Go(zj q) is a concave function of z;
(ii) Gh(zj; q) is a concave function of z;
(iii) Go(bzj q) = Gh(bzj; q);
(iv) Go(zj q) ? Gh(zj; q) for z ? bz;
(v) if @zGh(bzj; q)  0 then @zGo(bzj q) > @zGh(bzj; q)  0;
(vi) if @zGo(bzj q)  0 then @zGh(bzj; q) < @zGo(bzj q)  0:
Also, denote:
go(q)  max
z bz Go(zj q); (A18)
gh(; q)  max
q z bzGh(zj; q); (A19)
Go(q)  max
z  q
Go(zj q); (A20)
Gh(; q)  max
z q
Gh(zj; q): (A21)
Lemma A5. Suppose that PM = [p0; p] where p0 = peq  and p = 2+peq :
Then q satises (A9) if and only if it satises the following two conditions:
Go(q)  
1  

V
M
+ (1  )V N

; (A22)
Gh(; q)  
1  

V
M
+ (1  )V N

: (A23)
Proof. In the proof of Lemma A2 it was shown that in considering (A9) it su¢ ces
to restrict attention to z  q: In which case, using (A16)-(A19), it is straightforward
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to verify that (A9) boils down to the following two conditions:
go(q)  
1  

V
M
+ (1  )V N

; (A24)
gh(; q)  
1  

V
M
+ (1  )V N

: (A25)
Since the choice sets in maximization problems (A20)-(A21) are larger than the
respective choice sets in maximization problems (A18)-(A19), then go(q)  Go(q)
and gh(; q)  Gh(; q): Thus, any q satisfying (A22)-(A23) must necessarily satisfy
(A24)-(A25).
To show that the opposite holds true, consider two cases.
Case 1. (A25) is stronger than (A24), i.e.,
go(q)  gh(; q): (A26)
Note that (A26) can be satised only if @zGh(bzj; q) < 0: To show this, suppose, to
the contrary, that @zGh(bzj; q)  0: This condition and condition (ii), taken together,
imply that Gh(zj; q) is increasing on (q; bz) and, therefore, gh(; q) = Gh(bzj; q): In
turn, this condition and conditions (iii) and (iv), taken together, imply that gh(; q) <
go(q) which violates (A26).
Next, the condition @zGh(bzj; q) < 0 and condition (i), taken together, imply that
Gh(zj; q) is decreasing for all z > bz: Thus, Gh(; q) = gh(; q) and, therefore, (A25)
and (A23) are equivalent.
Suppose that @zGo(bzj q) > 0: In this case, condition (i) implies that Go(zj q) is
increasing for all z < bz: Thus, Go(q) = go(q) and, therefore, (A24) and (A22) are
equivalent.
Finally, suppose that @zGo(bzj q)  0: In this case, condition (i) implies that Go(zj q)
must have a unique global maximal point at zo  bz: But since Go(zj q) < Gh(zj; q)
for all z < bz and @zGh(bzj; q) < @zGo(bzj q)  0; it must be Go(q) < gh(; q): Thus,
(A22) must be satised whenever (A25) (alternatively, (A23)) is satised.
Case 2. (A24) is stronger than (A25), i.e.,
go(q)  gh(; q): (A27)
Note that (A27) can be satised only if @zGo(bzj q) > 0: To show this, suppose, to
the contrary, that @zGo(bzj q)  0: In which case, since Go(zj q) is concave, it must be
decreasing for all z > bz and, therefore, go(q) = Go(bzj q): This condition and conditions
(iii) and (iv), taken together, imply that go(q) < gh(; q) which violates (A27).
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As before, in case @zGo(bzj q) > 0; we have Go(q) = go(q) which implies that (A24)
and (A22) are equivalent. Likewise, in case @zGh(bzj; q) < 0; we have Gh(; q) =
gh(; q) which implies that (A25) and (A23) are equivalent.
Finally, suppose that @zGh(bzj; q)  0: In this case, condition (i) implies that
Gh(zj; q) must have a unique global maximal point at zh  bz: But since Go(zj q) >
Gh(zj; q) for all z > bz and @zGo(bzj q) > @zGh(bzj; q)  0; it must be go(q) >
Gh(; q): Thus, (A23) must be satised whenever (A24) (alternatively, (A22)) is sat-
ised. 
Dene the function:
V N (; q)  (1  )e(q) + 

V
M
+ (1  )V N

; (A28)
and denote:
(; q)  argmax
; q
V N (; q)
s:t: (A22) and (A23) hold.
Lemma A6. The optimal collusive strategy  implies that in every period on the
equilibrium path rms produce the same output q and meet only if the price falls
within the interval [peq  ; p] where p  peq +:
Proof. Set p = 2+ peq   and consider the following strategy N (; q):
 In period t = 0 propose no meeting and produce q;
 In period t = 1 play N if p 2 (p; peq +]; play M if p 2 [peq  ; p]; otherwise,
play .
By construction, N (; q) yields the expected payo¤ V N (; q): By Lemma A3,
N (; q) is an equilibrium strategy whenever (; q) satises (A9). In which case,
V N (; q) 2 VN and, therefore, V N (; q)  V N for all (; q) satisfying (A9). In
particular, V N (; q)  V N since, by Lemma A5, (; q) satises (A9).
Consider the outcome (N ; qN ) generated by N in period t = 0: By Lemma A5,
it must satisfy (A22) and (A23). In which case, using the denition of (; q); we
must have V N (N ; qN )  V N (; q): Since, by construction, N (N ; qN ) = N ; then
V
N  V N (; q)  V N which implies:
V N (; q) = V
N
: (A29)
Next, consider the following strategy M (; q):
 In period t = 0 propose to meet; produce q if the meeting has taken place,
otherwise produce qn and play  from the next period onwards;
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 In period t = 1 proceed as the strategy N (; q) requires to do from this period
onwards.
By construction, M (; q) yields the expected payo¤ VM (; q) = V N (; q)  (1 
)F e: By Lemma A3, if (; q) satises (A8) and (A9) then M (; q) is an equilibrium
strategy. In which case, VM (; q) 2 VM and, therefore, VM (; q)  VM for all (; q)
satisfying (A8) and (A9).
Note that the set of outcomes (; q) satisfying (A8) and (A9) is at least as large as
the set of outcomes (; q) satisfying (A9) only. Lemma A5 and the fact that (A8) is
equivalent to V N (; q)   (1   )F e  0 imply that the former set is non empty only
if (; q) satises (A8), i.e., V N (; q)   (1   )F e  0: In which case, using the
denition of V
M
; we must have VM (; q)  VM :
As before, consider the outcome (M ; qM ) generated by M in period t = 0: By
Lemma A2, (M ; qM ) must satisfy (A8) and (A9). In which case, using the den-
ition of (; q); we must have VM (M ; qM )  VM (; q): Since, by construction,
M (M ; qM ) = M ; then V
M  VM (; q)  VM which implies:
VM (; q) = V
M
: (A30)
Using (A28), (A29) and (A30), it is straightforward to verify that V
N
= e(q) 
F e which is possible only if in all periods on the equilibrium path rms produce
the same output q and meet only if the price falls within the interval [peq   ; p]
where p = 2 + peq   : To complete the proof, it su¢ ces to note that  = N
since V
N
> V
M
: 
Lemma A7. V
N
= e(q)  F e where (; q) solves (P1).
Proof. Since  (; q) (which is dened in the text) is an equilibrium strategy then
e(q)  F e 2 VN and therefore:
e(q)  F e  V N ; (A31)
where V
N
= e(q)  F e; by Lemma A6.
On the other hand, since the outcome path induced by (; q) generates the
expected payo¤s V
N
= e(q) F e and VM = V N   (1 )F e; then (; q) must
satisfy (OD) and (HD). Given that (; q) solves (P1), we must then have:
e(q)  F e  V N : (A32)
Taken together, (A31) and (A32) imply that V
N
= e(q)  F e: 
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B. Proof of Proposition 3
Using the expressions for e(z; q) and e(q); one can verify:
max
z  q
e(z; bq) e(bq) = 1 + n
2
2
(qn   bq)2 : (B1)
In what follows, it will prove useful to write e(q) as (using Assumption 1):
e(q) = (qn   q) ((n  1)qn   n (qn   q)) : (B2)
Taken together, (B1) and (B2) imply that the set of outputs satisfying (ODtc)
is the interval [bqo; qn]: Likewise, the set of outputs satisfying (HDtc) is the interval
[bqh; qn]: It is straightforward to verify that bqo  qn for any  2 (0; 1): In contrast,bqh  qn if and only if:
0 

@
@bq

2(n+ 1)(qn   bq)  
1  
e(bq)bq= qn
=   2(n+ 1) + 
1   (n  1)q
n;
which is equivalent to   bmin where bmin is given by:
bmin  1
1 + (n 1)q
n
2(n+1)
: (B3)
Hence, the set of outputs satisfying both (ODtc) and (HDtc) is non empty if and
only if   bmin: In which case, it is given by the interval [maxfbqo; bqhg; qn]: Since e(q)
decreases on [qm; qn]; the solution to (P2) takes the form:
bq = maxfqm; bqo; bqhg:
Next, the condition bqh  bqo holds only if (ODtc) is stronger than (HDtc) for bq = bqh;
i.e., 
1 + n
2
2
(qn   bqh)2  2(n+ 1)(qn   bqh);
which yields bqh  qn   8=(n + 1): In turn, this condition holds only for those s
which satisfy: 
2(n+ 1)(qn   bq)  
1  
e(bq)bq= qn  8n+1  0;
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which yields   b where b is given by:
b   n  1
n+ 1
2
+
(n  1)qn
2(n+ 1)
! 1
:
Using (ODtc) and (HDtc); it is straightforward to verify that bqo and bqh are de-
creasing functions of : Therefore, bqh 7 bqo for  ? b:
Denote by bmh (respectively, by bmo ) the discount factor for which bqh = qm (respec-
tively, bqo = qm): Routing calculations yield:
bmh  1 + (n  1)qn4(n+ 1)
 1
;
bmo 
 
1 + n

2
n+ 1
2! 1
:
It is straightforward to verify that bmh < bmo if and only if:
 <
(n  1) (n+ 1)
16n
qn =
a(n  1)
16n
:
Note also that the condition maxfqm; bqo; bqhg = bqo is possible if and only if:
b < bmh ,  < (n  1) (n+ 1)16n qn = a(n  1)16n :
To complete the proof, it su¢ ces to set b1 = minfb;bmh g and b2 = maxfb1;bmo g: 
C. Proof of Proposition 4
Since bqh() decreases from qn to qm on [bmin;bmh ] while e(q) decreases on [qm; qn];
then e(bqh()) increases from 0 to m on [bmin;bmh ]. For a given F e; dene the setb
F as: b
F  n :  2 [bmin;bmh ] and (1  )F e  e(bqh())o :
In the case  =2 b
F the proof is given in the text. Thus, only the case  2 b
F
needs to be considered. In addition, since communication can enhance collusion only
if it allows rms to sustain the output q < bqh; in what follows the analysis will be
restricted to those values of q only.
In this case, the fact that (HDtc) is binding for bqh; in particular, implies that q
must satisfy 2(n + 1)(qn   q) > e(q)=(1   ): Using this condition and replacing
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e(z; q) and V
N
by their expressions, the left hand side of (9) takes the form:
max
z q

(n+ 1)(qn   q)  
1  
e(q)  F e
2
  (z   q)

(z   q)
=
1
4

(n+ 1)(qn   q)  
1  
e(q)  F e
2
2
:
Since the above expression is strictly positive, (9) can be satised only if its right
hand side is also strictly positive, i.e., only if  > 0 and e(q)   F e > (1   )F e:
In which case, using the fact that (1   )F e  e(bqh) for any  2 b
F ; one obtains
e(q)  F e > e(bqh) for any (; q) satisfying (9) :
Dene the function:
g(q; ; n)  e(q)  1  


max
z
e(z; q) e(q)

:
Using (B1) and (B2), g(q; ; n) can be written as:
g(q; ; n) = (qn   q)

(n  1)qn  

n+
1  

(1 + n)2
4

(qn   q)

: (C1)
For a given vector of model parameters   (; F e;; n); dene the functions:
(; q;)    g(q; ; n)
F e
;
	(; q;)  1
4

(n+ 1)(qn   q)  
1  
e(q)  F e
2
2
  (
e(q)  (1   + )F e)
1   :
By rearranging the terms, 	(; q;) can be written as:
	(; q;) =
1
(1  )F e

(F e)2 (1 + ())2 (C2)
  (F e) (d(q;)  2()b(q;))+ ()b2(q;)

;
where
b(q;)  2(1  )

(n+ 1)(qn   q) e(q); (C3)
d(q;)  e(q)  (1  )F e; (C4)
() 


4
2
F e
1   : (C5)
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Using (B2) and (n  1)qn = 2(n+ 1)(1  bmin)=bmin; b(q;) can be written as:
b(q;) = (qn   q)
 
n(qn   q) + 2(n+ 1)
bmin   bmin
!
: (C6)
Again, using (B2) and also m = ((n  1)qn)2 =4n; d(q;) can be written as:
d(q;) = n
 
(qn   q)  x( )()
  
x(+)()  (qn   q)

; (C7)
where
x()()  (n  1)q
n
2n
 
1
r
1  (1  )F
e
m
!
: (C8)
By construction, (; q) satises (OD) and (HD) if and only if it satises:
(; q;)  0; (C9)
	(; q;)  0: (C10)
To prove the proposition, it su¢ ces to show that there exists a threshold F such
that for F e  F and  2 b
F there always exists (; q) satisfying (C9) and (C10). Since
(C9) can be satised for any F e; the necessarily condition for the threshold F to exist
is that (C10) cannot be satised for some F e > 0:
Using the expressions for () and 	(); it is straightforward to verify that @	=@ <
0; @=@ < 0; @	=@F e > 0 and @=@F e > 0: The rst two conditions, in particular,
imply that if (C9) and (C10) are satised for  = inf b
F = bmin; then a fortiori they
will be satised for any  > bmin (provided that the other parameters are held xed).
Thus, for the rest of the analysis it will assumed that  = bmin:
Denote b  (bmin; F e;; n) and b  (b): Using (B3) and m = ((n  1)qn)2 =4n;
one can verify: b = (n+ 1)2
16nm
F e
1 + 2(n+1)(n 1)qn
: (C11)
Since 	(; q; b) is a quadratic function of ; then, for given q and b; (C10) can be
satised in the relevant range in which  > 0 only if the equation 	(; q; b) = 0 has
real roots. In turn, this is possible only if:
d(q; b)  2bb(q; b) > 0;
(d(q; b)  2bb(q; b))2  4b (1 + b) b2(q; b);
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which imply:
d(q; b)  (b)b(q; b); (C12)
where ()  2(1 +p1 + 1=):
Using (C6), b(q;) evaluated at  = bmin yields:
b(q; b) = n(qn   q)2: (C13)
Substituting (C7) and (C13) into (C12) and rearranging the terms leads to (after
dividing by n):
(1 + (b))x2   (bx(+) + bx( ))x+ bx(+)bx( )  0; (C14)
where x  qn   q and bx()  x()(b):
Since the left hand side of (C14) is a quadratic function of x; (C14) can be satised
in the relevant range in which x > 0 only if:
(bx(+) + bx( ))2  4(1 + (b)) bx(+)bx( ):
Using (C11), (C8) and (B3), the above condition can be written as:
1  (1 + (b))(1  bmin)F e
m
=
16n
(n+ 1)2
b(1 + (b)): (C15)
Dene Tn as the solution to the following equation:
1 =
16n
(n+ 1)2
Tn(1 + (Tn)): (C16)
Since 0() > 0; then Tn is unique and strictly positive. Using this, (C15) can be
stated as b  Tn: Substituting (C11) into this condition and rearranging the terms
yields F e  bF where bF is given by:
bF  16nTn
(n+ 1)2

1 +
2(n+ 1)
(n  1)qn

m: (C17)
The analysis thus implies that, for any  2 b
F ; (C10) can be satised only if
F e  bF : In addition, it also implies that, for F e = bF and  = bmin; there exists a
unique (b; bq) such that:
	
b; bq;bmin; bF ;; n = 0:
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By performing routine calculations, one can verify:
bq = qn1  8(n  1)Tn
(n+ 1)2

; (C18)
b = r Tn
1 + Tn
b(bq; b)bmin bF =
r
Tn
1 + Tn
16nTn
(n+ 1)2
(n  1)qn
2(n+ 1)
: (C19)
Note that, for (b; bq) to be sustainable in equilibrium, it must also satisfy:

b; bq;bmin; bF ; n  0: (C20)
Since	() and () are monotonic functions of F e (i.e., @	=@F e > 0 and @=@F e >
0); it follows that F = bF if (C20) is satised, and F < bF otherwise.
Note that (C19), in particular, implies that b approaches innity, as  tends to
zero. In which case, (C20) cannot be satised because g() is bounded from above.
Thus, it must necessarily be F < bF for  small enough. The following lemma states
the conditions under which F = bF :
Lemma C1. (C20) is satised for  large enough and n  12:
Proof. Since bmin; bF and b are continuous functions of  and n (as implied by
(B3), (C17) and (C19), respectively), then the composite function (b; bq;bmin; bF ; n)
is continuous with respect to these variables. Thus, it su¢ ces to show that (C20) can
be satised for the maximal value of  which is equal to qn here. In which case, by
continuity, it will also be satised for s su¢ ciently close to qn:
Substituting  = qn into (C19) yields:
bj= qn =r Tn1 + Tn 16nTn(n+ 1)2 (n  1)2(n+ 1) : (C21)
Note that (C16), taken with the fact that ()  0; implies that 16nTn=(n+1)2 < 1
and, therefore, bj= qn < 1:
Using (B3), (C1), (C17) and (C18), one can verify:
g(bq;bmin; n)bF

= qn
=
2(n  1)
(3n+ 1)

1  (n
2 + 8n  1)Tn
(n+ 1)2

; (C22)
which is lower than one.
Substituting (C21) and (C22) into the expression for () and rearranging the terms
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yields:

b; bq;bmin; bF ; n
= qn
=
2(n  1)
(3n+ 1)
"
16nTn
(n+ 1)2
 r
Tn
1 + Tn
3n+ 1
4(n+ 1)
+
n2 + 8n  1
16n
!
  1
#
:
Using the above condition, (C20) evaluated at  = qn takes the form:
16nTn
(n+ 1)2
 r
Tn
1 + Tn
3n+ 1
4(n+ 1)
+
n2 + 8n  1
16n
!
 1: (C23)
Since () is an increasing function while the fraction 16n=(n+ 1)2 decreases as n
increases, then Tn (dened by (C16)) must be an increasing function of n: From the
condition (1 + ())j=1=8 < (n+ 1)2=16n

n=2
it follows that T2 > 1=8: As a result,
Tn  T2 > 1=8 for all n  2:
Next, since 0() > 0 and ()j=1=8 = 1; then () > 1 for all  > 1=8: Taken
together, this condition and Tn > 1=8 imply that Tn(1 + (Tn)) > 2Tn: In turn, this
condition and the fact that Tn satises (C16) imply that 16nTn=(n+1)2 < 1=2: Finally,
using the latter condition and Tn=(1 + Tn) < 1; we have:
'(n)  1
2

3n+ 1
4(n+ 1)
+
n2 + 8n  1
16n

>
16nTn
(n+ 1)2
 r
Tn
1 + Tn
3n+ 1
4(n+ 1)
+
n2 + 8n  1
16n
!
:
Since '(n) is an increasing function and '(12) ' 0:98; (C23) is satised for all
n  12. 
Lemma C2. bF  m for  large enough and n  12:
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that bF evaluated at the the maximal value of  (which
is equal to qn) is strictly larger than m; provided that n  12: In which case, by
continuity, this will also hold true for s su¢ ciently close to qn:
Substituting  = qn into (C17) yields:
1
m
bF 
= qn
=
16nTn
(n+ 1)2
(3n+ 1)
(n  1) : (C24)
Note that (1 + ()) < 4 ( + 1=2) for all  > 0: Taken together, this condition
and (C16) imply that (n + 1)2=16n < 4Tn(Tn + 1=2): From the latter condition it
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follows:
Tn >
1
4
 r
1 +
(n+ 1)2
4n
  1
!
=
(n+ 1)2
16n
 r
1 +
(n+ 1)2
4n
+ 1
! 1
: (C25)
Using (C24) and (C25), we have:
1
m
bF 
= qn
>  (n)  3n+ 1
n  1
 r
1 +
(n+ 1)2
4n
+ 1
! 1
:
Since  (n) is a decreasing function and  (12) ' 1:08; the conclusion follows. 
D. Proof of Proposition 5
The proof proceeds by way of two lemmas.
Lemma D1. Explicit collusion cannot be sustained as  tends to zero.
Proof. Any sustainable outcome (; q) must satisfy (OD) and (HD). Consider rst
(OD). Since the function e(q)   F e is bounded from above, the left hand side of
(OD) must approach zero, as  tends to zero, which is possible only if q approaches
qn:
Consider now (HD). First, let us show that the left hand side of (HD) must be
strictly positive as  tends to zero. Suppose, to the contrary, that it is not. In which
case, for  small enough (HD) boils down to the following two conditions:
max
z 0

(n+ 1)(qn   q)  
1  
e(q)  F e
2
  z

z = 0; (D1)
 (e(q)  (1   + )F e)  0: (D2)
Since e(qn) = 0; @e(qn)=@q < 0 and  > 0; (D2) can be satised only if q < qn:
In turn, (D1) can be satised only if the slope of the maximand in (D1) evaluated at
z = 0 is non-positive. This yields (using (C6)):
F e  e(q)  2(1  )

(n+ 1)(qn   q) =  b(q;)
=   (qn   q)
 
n(qn   q) + 2(n+ 1)
bmin   bmin
!
:
The above condition necessarily implies that q > qn for all  < bmin: Thus, (D1)
and (D2) contradict each other.
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In the proof of Proposition 4 it was established that, for a given  = (; F e;; n);
(ND) can be satised only if:
d(q;)  (())b(q;); (D3)
where () = 2(1 +
p
1 + 1=) while b(q;); d(q;) and () are given by (C3),
(C4) and (C5), respectively. Substituting (C6) and (C7) into (D3) yields (using that
x = qn   q):
n
 
x  x( )()
  
x(+)()  x
  x(()) nx+ 2(n+ 1)bmin   bmin
!
;
where x()() is given by (C8). By rearranging the terms and dividing by n; the above
condition writes as:
2()x
2   1()x+ 0()  0: (D4)
where 2()  1 + (()); 0()  x(+)()x( )() and
1()  x(+)() + x( )() 
2(n+ 1)
n
bmin   bmin (()):
Using (B3), (C5) and (C8), one can verify:
lim
!0
2() = 1;
lim
!0
1() =

n  1
n
qn
 
1  n+ 1
2
r
F e
nm
!
;
lim
!0
0() =

n  1
2n
qn
2
F e
m
:
Taken together, the above conditions imply that for  small enough (D4) approxi-
mates to:
x2  

n  1
n
qn
 
1  n+ 1
2
r
F e
nm
!
x+

n  1
2n
qn
2
F e
m
+O()  0;
which cannot be satised for x close enough to zero. 
Thus, explicit collusion is not sustainable for  small enough. On the other hand, it
must be sustainable for  large enough (since in this case tacit collusion is sustainable
and, by Proposition 4, so is explicit one). Taken with the fact that (OD) and (HD)
are monotonic in ; this implies that there must exist a threshold min 2 (0;bmin] such
43
that explicit collusion is sustainable if and only if   min:
Lemma D2. If F e < F; then min < bmin:
Proof. From Proposition 3 it follows that (HDtc) is binding for  = bmin: By
Proposition 4, there always exists (; q) satisfying (C9) and (C10) when  = bmin and
F e = F : Note that the left hand sides of (C9) and (C10) are continuous functions of 
and decreasing functions of F e: Thus, for F e < F there must exist F > 0 such that
for any  2 (bmin   F ;bmin) both constraints are satised for some (; q): 
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Figure 1: The probability  as a function of  and n given  = 0:09 and F = 0:02:
Figure 2: The probability  as a function of  and  given n = 4 and F = 0:02:
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